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EATON v. COMMONWEALTH
No. 900238 (1990) (LEXIS State library, 125)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
OnFebruary2Oth, 1989, Dennis Eaton shotandkilledhisroommate
near their home in Shenandoah County, Virginia. He then shot and killed
his neighbor, and stole both his wallet and automobile. Eaton and his
girlfriend, JudyMcDonald, drove the stolen automobile south on interstate
highway 81. At 11:30 p.m. Jerry Hines, a Virginia state trooper, stopped
the couple in Rockbridge County because he suspected McDonald of
operating the vehicle while intoxicated. The trooper reported having
trouble with a drunk driver and requested assistance. Another trooper
arrived at 11:55 and found Hines dead from two gunshot wounds. Also
at the scene was a traffic citation charging McDonald.
The couple was found at 1:30 a.m. in Salem, and a high speed car
chase followed, ending with the crash of the stolen vehicle. Beforepolice
could get to the couple, Eaton shotMcDonaldin the head, killing her, and
then shot himself. Forensics tests showed McDonald had handled the
weapon used in all the killings. Empty shell casings were found in
Eaton's pockets, but he tested negatively for handling the gun.
Eaton did not directly admitto any of thekillings during questioning.
When asked if McDonald shot Hines, Eaton said that McDonald was a
good girl, and would not have hurt anybody. Later he claimed that
McDonald killed the trooper. During the questioning by police, Eaton
asked whetherhe could havealawyer. Eaton also askedfor a clarification
of his rights and made statements indicating his concern that counsel be
present. The police replied that he could have a lawyer, clarified his
rights, and continued the questioning. They did not ask whether he
wanted a lawyer or attempt to focus Eaton's ambiguous language. On
another occasion, Eaton refused to talk to an investigator. Three days
later, he was given Miranda warnings again and re-questioned. Some of
the responses Eaton made to officers during custody were used to show
he murdered Hines. Eaton made these statements without his lawyer
being present. Eaton's cellmate also testified Eaton admitted to killing
the trooper. Eaton was found guilty of capital murder under Va. Code
Ann. 1950 § 18.2-31(6), 264.4 (1990), and was sentenced to death based
upon his "future dangerousness".
HOLDING
Several claims were raised on appeal which were dependent on the
particular facts of the case or were dealt with in a conclusory manner by
the Virginia Supreme Court. These claims are not discussed in this
summary.
The court held inter alia, that Eaton's fifth amendment Miranda
rights were not violated during police questioning while Eaton was in
custody. The court acknowledged the rule in Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 482 (1981) and Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988)
which established that an accused's waiver of sixth amendment right to
counsel must not only be voluntary but also a knowing and intelligent
relinquishment of a known right. The court said that a waiver of the right
to counsel need not be explicit, but can be demonstrated by the cir-
cumstances in the case, citing as authority Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240
Va. 26, 35, 395 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990). Eaton v. Commonwealth, (Va.,
Sept. 21, 1990) (LEXIS, State library, 125) at 7-8.
The court held that "[a] mere refusal to speak...is not the same as
a request for counsel." Id. at 8. Therefore, Eaton's refusal to speak with
an investigator did not prohibit further interviews initiated by the police
without counsel being present.
The court concluded that a request for counsel in Virginia must be
"unambiguous and unequivocal". Id. at 9, citing Poyner v. Common-
wealth, 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815 (1985) and Bunch v. Common-
wealth, 225 Va. 423,304 S.E.2d 271 (Va. 1983). The court said that after
the accused receives Miranda warnings and begins to answer questions
putto him by police, hemustfirst clearly asserthis rightto counselbefore
the police must cease questioning and the Edwards rule attaches. Eaton
v. Commonwealth, No. 900238 (Va., Sept. 21, 1990) (LEXIS, State
Library, 125) at 9-10.
The court also held that a voir dire question which would have
informed the jury that Eaton would be ineligible for parole if sentenced
to life in prison was rightfully excluded. The court said that any
information pertaining to the post-sentencing status of the defendant is
irrelevant evidence to the jury, and that the jury has no right to
information concerning post sentencing events. Id. at 6, citing Poyner v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401,432, 329 S.E.2d 815, 836 (1985).
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The effect of Eaton is primarily to reinforce an already difficult
standard of establishing the constitutional rightto an attorney in Virginia.
Thecourtholds thatin orderto trigger the right to counsel and to preclude
further police interrogation without counsel present, an accused must
use language that is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal. Essentially,
any language like"maybe I should see a lawyer," or "can I get a lawyer",
etc. will not be enough to trigger the right to have an attorney present. An
accused will have to request the presence of an attorney specifically in
order for his fifth and sixth amendment rights to attach.
Additionally, this holding makes it more difficult for an accused
to avoid waiving the right to have an attorney present. An accused cannot
prevent repeated questioning by remaining silent. Any comment that the
accused may make to the police appears to be sufficient for the court to
infer a willingness to respond to police without counsel present. The
court noted that the rationale behind adopting the "unambiguous and
unequivocal" request for counsel standard was to comply with the U.S.
Supreme Court's preference for "bright-line rules" in this area. Id. at 9.
Justice Lacy also offered a "bright line" in her dissenting opinion. The
dissent suggested that once confronted with ambiguous language con-
cerning request for counsel, police simply ask whether the accused
wants a lawyer before being asked further questions. Id. at 16. Fifth and
sixth amendment challenges should still be brought in Virginia since the
holding of Eaton exists in the absence of a definitive Supreme Court
ruling on what words or actions trigger the right to have an attorney
present and when the police must cease initiating questioning.
The court's decision that the jury did not have the right to be
informed of Eaton's parole ineligibility may be constitutional error. The
jury sentenced Eaton to death based upon his future dangerousness. The
jury is required to consider all of the evidence in mitigation or connected
with the probability of Eaton's future dangerousness. Va. Code Ann.
1950 § 19.2-264.4 (1990). Parole ineligibility is a factor in the factual
reality of this consideration. Without accurate information about where
the defendant will be in the future, the jury cannot properly determine his
future dangerousness to society. Additionally, life without parole is
mitigation evidence because the severity of the sentence is so great that
it properly affects determination of the propriety of a death sentence. To
withhold information concerning the law regarding the accused from the
jury is error that may not ultimately withstand challenge. In cases where
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a life sentence would mean life without parole, defense counsel should there will be further appellate review and well constructed arguments
continue to make the record on this issue through voir dire and proposed may eventually succeed in Federal court. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger,
jury instructions. 481 U.S. 393 (1987), Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 104 (1982).
The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently rejected constitu-
tional objections to the application of the capital statute. Defense counsel Summary and analysis by:
must continue to raise meritorious constitutional challenges, because Peter Hansen
STATE HABEAS IN VIRGINIA: A CRITICAL TRANSITION
BY: CATHERINE M. HOBART
A defendant convicted of capital murder has a statutory right to
post-conviction review of his judgment and sentence.' This statute al-
lows the defendant to petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the circuit
court which entered the original judgment order of conviction. 2 An
evidentiary hearing may be granted in response to the petition and can
be held at any circuit court within the circuit in which the petition was
filed.3 If the circuit court denies petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, the
defendant may appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.4 The right to
habeas review at both the circuit court level and the Virginia Supreme
Court is a statutory right and is "not a necessary element of due process.
Thus, no due process violation occurs if an appeal is barred."5
In Virginia, as the law stands today, there is no constitutional right
to counsel at the state habeas level. 6 However, there is a statutory en-
titlement in Virginia which permits the appointment of counsel at state
habeas proceedings. 7 The Attorney General's Office does not oppose
these appointments and they are routinely made if a pro se inmate can
raise at least one non-frivolous claim in the habeas petition.
Preparing for state habeas review of a capital conviction is not
simply a paper exercise. Because this is probably the last opportunity to
raise claims regarding the trial process, it is essential for the habeas
attorney to reinvestigate all of the facts regarding the defendant's case.
Upon completion of the reinvestigation, each and every claim of error
that can be found to have existed at trial or on direct review must be
included in the state habeas petition. It is also critically important that
these claims be grounded in federal law as well as applicable state law.'
The Virginia Supreme Court has a restrictive policy regarding the
scope of state habeas review, especially where procedural requirements
have not been met. Habeas courts will almost always refuse to hear
claims that are procedurally defaulted or which have already been
decided on their merits. For this and other reasons, state habeas relief is
almost never granted. Yet, it is a critical transition stage to federal
review. Therefore, regardless of their potential for success, all claims
must be raised in the state habeas petition.
Reinvestigation is also important because it may uncover facts
whichcouldultimately meritreliefandovertum aconvictionorsentence.
Further, there are circumstances and exceptions under federal law that
may allow claims to be heard on their merits despite the fact that they are
defaulted under state law. There are many reasons supporting the same
conclusion: All claims must be included in the state habeas petition.
In addition to raising all state claims, any claims which the
defendant wishes to raise at federal habeas must also be raised in the state
habeas petition. This is necessary for two reasons. First, 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) requires that all state remedies be exhausted before a federal
habeas corpus petition can be granted. "The doctrine of exhaustion of
state remedies is satisfied if the same claim raised in a federal habeas
proceeding has been presented previously before the highest state court,
either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding."9 Second, a
federal claim which is not properly raised in the state system will be
procedurally defaulted. A finding of procedural default at the state
habeas level will usually bar review at the federal habeas level. In
Wainwright v. Sykes,'0 the Supreme Court held that a state finding of
procedural default would bar federal habeas review unless both 'cause'
excusing the default and 'prejudice' resulting from non-review could be
shown. Smith v. Baker," stated that the procedural bar would be upheld
on federal habeas if, "the State procedural rule serves an adequate State
interest.., and the rule has been reasonably applied."'
2
State habeas claims can be said to fall into three categories. Those
which have been procedurally defaulted, those which have already been
decided on direct review and those new claims which could only have
been broughtbefore the court atthe state habeas level. Abriefexplanation
of case law in each of these categories will facilitate an understanding of
why so few claims actually receive state habeas consideration on their
merits.
A. Claims Which Were Not Raised at the State Trial Level
In Slayton v. Parrigan,3 a prisoner convicted of robbery claimed
in his state habeas petition that his in-court identification by the victim
"was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification."' 4
The petitioner had failed to raise this claim during trial and on direct
appeal. The Virginia Supreme Court held that "[a] prisoneris not entitled
to use habeas corpus to circumvent the trial and appellate processes for
an inquiry into an alleged non-jurisdictional defect of a judgment of
conviction."'" Therefore, it is extremely important to object to all
potential constitutional violations during trial 6 and further, to raise those
issues on direct appeal.17 Failure to do so may bar the claims from ever
receiving habeas review.
B. Claims Decided On Their Merits On Direct Review
In Hawks v. Cox,8 a prisoner attempted to raise claims in a state
habeas petition which were the subject of previous adverse judicial
rulings. The Virginia Supreme Court held that a "previous determination
of the issues by either state or federal courts will be conclusive."' 9 Thus,
whenever claims have been decided on their merits by the Virginia
Supreme Court on direct appeal, the Attorney General will argue that
Hawks controls and that the claims should be dismissed. It may fre-
quently be argued in response, however, that the Virginia Supreme
Court's denial of the claims was based only on a determination that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the ruling, rather than
a determination that the trial court made the proper ruling. If that is the
case, the statehabeas court will notviolateHawks by reviewing the claims.
In any event, claims dismissed on Hawks grounds are properly ex-
hausted and preserved for federal habeas review.
C. Claims Which Could Only Be Raised At State Habeas
Because of the holdings in Hawks and Parrigan, the only claims
likely to be decided at state habeas are those which could not be raised
until after the trial and direct appeal stages were completed. The most
common of these claims are those arising from the ineffective assistance
of counsel, Brady 2" violations, and prosecutorial, judicial or law en-
